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Abstract
Recently, Kannan et al. [2018] proposed several logit regularization methods to
improve the adversarial robustness of classifiers. We show that the computationally
fast methods they propose – Clean Logit Pairing (CLP) and Logit Squeezing
(LSQ) – just make the gradient-based optimization problem of crafting adversarial
examples harder without providing actual robustness. We find that Adversarial
Logit Pairing (ALP) may indeed provide robustness against adversarial examples,
especially when combined with adversarial training, and we examine it in a variety
of settings. However, the increase in adversarial accuracy is much smaller than
previously claimed. Finally, our results suggest that the evaluation against an
iterative PGD attack relies heavily on the parameters used and may result in false
conclusions regarding robustness of a model.
1 Introduction
Szegedy et al. [2013] showed that state-of-the-art image classifiers are not robust against certain
small perturbations of the inputs, known as adversarial examples. Since then, many new attacks
have been proposed aiming at better ways of crafting adversarial examples, and also many new
defenses to increase the robustness of classifiers. Notably, almost all defenses previously proposed
have been broken by applying different attacks [Carlini and Wagner, 2017, Athalye and Sutskever,
2017, Athalye and Carlini, 2018, Athalye et al., 2018].
(a) Adv. Training (b) Logit Squeezing (c) Clean Logit Pairing (d) Adv. Logit Pairing
Figure 1: Input loss surfaces of MNIST models in a random subspace around an input image with
 = 38.25. We can clearly see a distorted loss surface for the logit regularization methods, which can
prevent gradient-based attacks from succeeding. Additional visualizations are found in Figures 4, 5,
6, and 7 in the Appendix.
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A prominent defense that could not be broken so far is adversarial training [Goodfellow et al., 2014,
Madry et al., 2017]. There is also a line of work on the provable robustness of classifiers [Hein
and Andriushchenko, 2017, Wong and Kolter, 2018, Raghunathan et al., 2018], classifiers which
by definition cannot be broken because they derive and report a lower bound on the worst-case
adversarial accuracy, i.e. the accuracy of the model on the strongest possible adversarial examples
under the given threat model. On the other hand, any attack provides only an upper bound on the
worst-case adversarial accuracy, which we will refer to as just adversarial accuracy. The problem
with many recently proposed defenses is that they evaluate only upper bounds, which might be
arbitrarily loose, i.e. there might exist an attack which is able to reduce the adversarial accuracy
significantly compared to some baseline attack. However, one of the main issues with lower bounds
is that they are usually too small to be useful, so a special way of maximizing them is applied during
training. This may interfere with a proposed defense which one aims to evaluate. Thus, providing
non-trivial lower bounds – with or without special training – is an important and active area of
research [Wong et al., 2018, Zhang et al., 2018, Xiao et al., 2018, Croce et al., 2018]. Unfortunately,
these methods do not yet scale to large-scale datasets like ImageNet, and thus one still has to rely
solely on upper bounds on adversarial accuracy to estimate the robustness on these datasets.
Given the recent history of breaking most of the defenses accepted at ICLR 2018 [Athalye et al.,
2018, Uesato et al., 2018], it is now natural to question any new non-certified defense. Many recent
papers [Buckman et al., 2018, Kannan et al., 2018, Yao et al., 2018] that claim robustness of their
models mainly rely on the PGD attack from Madry et al. [2017] with the default settings. They
assume that they evaluate their models against a “strong adversary” and that the adversarial accuracy
they obtain is close to the minimal possible. In this paper, we show that it is not the case for CLP,
LSQ and some ALP models proposed by Kannan et al. [2018].
Threat model and attack settings. We consider the classification of images with pixel values in
[0, 255] and focus on the white-box threat model, i.e. an attacker has complete knowledge of the
model. We consider adversarial perturbations bounded with respect to an L∞ norm of  = 76.5 for
MNIST, and  = 16 for CIFAR-10 and Tiny ImageNet. We follow the settings of Kannan et al. [2018]
and evaluate MNIST and CIFAR-10 models with untargeted attacks. Tiny ImageNet models were
evaluated with targeted attacks which is consistent with Athalye et al. [2018]. For crafting adversarial
examples, we used the PGD attack [Madry et al., 2017] with maximum adversarial perturbation 
and experimented with different number of iterations n, step sizes i, and restarts r. For further
comparison we also evaluate all MNIST and CIFAR-10 models against the SPSA attack [Uesato
et al., 2018]. When crafting untargeted adversarial examples, we maximize the loss using the true
label.
Contribution. First, we give empirical evidence that CLP, LSQ, and some ALP models distort
the loss surface in the input space and thus fool gradient-based attacks without providing actual
robustness. This can be seen as a particular case of masked or obfuscated gradients [Papernot et al.,
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(c) Clean Logit Pairing
Figure 2: Heatmaps of the adversarial accuracy for 100% adversarial training [Madry et al.,
2017], LSQ, and CLP models trained on MNIST for different settings of step size i and num-
ber of iterations n when running the PGD attack with  = 76.5. Heatmaps for other models can be
found in Figures 9 and 10 in the Appendix. For all heatmaps, the adversarial accuracy was evaluated
on 1000 points drawn randomly from the test data.
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2017, Athalye et al., 2018]. We illustrate this by analyzing the input space loss surface in two random
directions (Figure 1). We provide an extensive experimental evaluation of the robustness of CLP, LSQ,
and ALP models on MNIST, CIFAR-10, and Tiny ImageNet datasets against the PGD attack with a
large number of iterations and random restarts reducing the adversarial accuracy of e.g. MNIST-LSQ
model from 70.6% to 5.0% (Table 1). Our results suggest that while CLP and LSQ do not provide
actual robustness, ALP may provide additional robustness on top of adversarial training. However,
the increase is much smaller than claimed by Kannan et al. [2018] (Table 3), and it remains unclear
whether this is actual robustness or the increase in adversarial accuracy is only due to the distortion of
the loss surface in the input space. Finally, we highlight the importance of performing many random
restarts and an exhaustive grid search over the attack parameters of PGD, especially when the loss
surface is distorted. We illustrate this by plotting the distribution of the loss values over different
restarts of PGD (Figure 3) as well as heatmaps of the adversarial accuracy for different PGD attack
parameters (Figures 2, 9, 10).
Related work. We note that a regularization term similar to ALP was proposed before in Heinze-
Deml and Meinshausen [2017] (the conditional variance penalty) in the context of adversarial domain
shifts. However, they do not study its effect in the context of Lp-bounded adversarial examples, thus
we only analyze the results of ALP from Kannan et al. [2018].
Recently, Engstrom et al. [2018] evaluated the robustness of ALP on a single ImageNet model.
However, there are important differences compared to our work. First, they do not explore the
robustness of the computationally cheap methods CLP and LSQ, which are a significant contribution
of Kannan et al. [2018]. Second, they only test an ALP model that was trained on clean examples,
while Kannan et al. [2018] mainly advocate for the usage of ALP combined with mixed-minibatch
PGD (i.e. training on 50% clean and 50% adversarial examples), which we explore in detail. Finally,
while Engstrom et al. [2018] only consider a single ImageNet model, we perform experiments
on MNIST, CIFAR10, and Tiny ImageNet and show that the conclusions depend on the dataset,
highlighting the importance of evaluating multiple models on multiple datasets before attempting to
draw general conclusions.
2 Experiments
We note that none of CLP nor LSQ models were officially released by Kannan et al. [2018]. Thus,
following Kannan et al. [2018] we train our CLP and LSQ models from scratch with Gaussian data
augmentation (denoted by N (µ, σ) in all tables). On MNIST we use the same LeNet architecture as
Kannan et al. [2018] and train all models for 500 epochs with a batch size of 200. For CIFAR-10,
we use the ResNet20-v2 architecture [He et al., 2016] and all models are trained for 100 epochs
Adversarial accuracy (L∞,  = 76.5)
Model Accuracy
SPSA attack PGD attack
bs = 8192 i = 2.55 i = 50.0 i = 50.0
n = 200 n = 40 n = 200 n = 200
r = 1 r = 1 r = 1 r = 10000
Plain 99.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
CLP 98.8% 44.8% 62.4% 29.1% 4.1%
LSQ 98.8% 54.1% 70.6% 39.0% 5.0%
Plain + ALP 98.5% 94.4% 96.0% 93.8% 88.9%
50% AT + ALP 98.3% 95.1% 97.2% 95.3% 89.9%
50% AT 99.1% 92.7% 95.6% 93.1% 88.2%
100% AT + ALP 98.4% 95.7% 96.6% 93.8% 85.7%
100% AT 98.9% 92.9% 95.2% 92.7% 88.0%
Table 1: Clean and adversarial accuracy against different attacks on MNIST. Adversarial accuracy is
evaluated against the PGD attack using  = 76.5 with different number of iterations n, step sizes i,
and restarts r. AT denotes adversarial training. CLP and LSQ models are trained with λ = 0.5 and
with N (0, 0.5) noise augmentation. All ALP models were trained with λ = 1.0.
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with a batch size of 128. On Tiny ImageNet we use the same ResNet50-v2 architecture as Kannan
et al. [2018] and analyze their pre-trained ALP models as well as our own models that we trained
from scratch with standard data augmentation and weight decay for 100 epochs using a batch size
of 256. Note that we do not perform any fine-tuning from pre-trained ImageNet models to better
understand the contribution of the logit pairing methods. For all models, we use the Adam optimizer
[Kingma and Adam, 2015], and evaluate on 1000 images drawn randomly from the test data. For
crafting adversarial examples, we use the PGD and SPSA attacks implemented in the Cleverhans
library [Papernot et al., 2018]. We apply adversarial training using the PGD attack with the step size
of 2.55 and 40 iterations for MNIST, and the step size of 2.0 and 10 iterations for CIFAR-10 and
Tiny ImageNet.
We visualize the cross-entropy loss in a two-dimensional subspace of the input space in the vicinity of
an input point x, where the subspace is spanned by two random signed vectors scaled by  = 38.25
for MNIST and  = 16.0 for CIFAR-10. We observe that the loss surfaces of models trained with
CLP, LSQ, and ALP can contain many local maxima which makes gradient-based attacks such as
PGD and SPSA difficult (Figure 1 and Figures 4, 5, 6, 7 in the Appendix). In order to deal with
this and in contrast to the results given by Kannan et al. [2018] and Engstrom et al. [2018], we
first perform a grid search over the step size i and the number of iterations n of the PGD attack.
We then run our attacks with multiple random restarts r and report the adversarial accuracy over
the most harmful restarts. We illustrate the importance of performing a grid search over the PGD
attack parameters in Figure 2. Additionally, we show the importance of having many random restarts
by plotting the distribution of the loss of the PGD attack across many restarts in Figure 3, which
highlights that there are cases where many random restarts are needed in order to find an adversarial
example.
We make our code and models publicly available1.
2.1 Results on MNIST
The results of our evaluation on MNIST are given in Table 1. We find that when performing only
a single restart of the PGD attack with the default settings, the model trained with LSQ provides
an adversarial accuracy of 70.6%. However, as can be seen in Figure 2, the default PGD settings
on MNIST (i = 2.55, n = 40) are suboptimal compared to having a larger step size and more
iterations. As a result, by increasing the step size as well as the number of iterations and restarts, we
can significantly reduce the adversarial accuracy of the LSQ model to 5.0%. Following the same
Adversarial accuracy (L∞,  = 16.0)
Model Accuracy
SPSA attack PGD attack
bs = 2048 i = 2.0 i = 4.0 i = 4.0
n = 100 n = 10 n = 400 n = 400
r = 1 r = 1 r = 1 r = 100
Plain 83.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
CLP 73.9% 0.3% 2.8% 0.4% 0.0%
LSQ 81.7% 13.6% 27.0% 7.0% 1.7%
Plain + ALP 71.5% 16.3% 23.6% 11.7% 10.7%
50% AT + ALP 70.4% 14.9% 21.8% 11.5% 10.5%
50% AT 73.8% 11.4% 18.6% 8.0% 7.3%
100% AT + ALP 65.7% 11.7% 19.0% 8.1% 6.4%
100% AT 65.7% 11.8% 16.0% 7.6% 6.7%
Table 2: Clean and adversarial accuracy against different attacks on CIFAR-10. Adversarial accuracy
is evaluated against the PGD attack using  = 16 with different number of iterations n, step sizes i,
and restarts r. AT denotes adversarial training. CLP and LSQ models are trained with λ = 0.25 and
with N (0, 0.06) noise augmentation. All ALP models were trained with λ = 0.5.
1https://github.com/uds-lsv/evaluating-logit-pairing-methods
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Adversarial accuracy (L∞,  = 16.0)
Model Accuracy
PGD attack
i = 2.0 i = 4.0 i = 4.0
n = 10 n = 400 n = 400
r = 1 r = 1 r = 100
Plain 53.0% 3.9% 0.4% 0.4%
CLP 48.5% 12.2% 1.7% 0.7%
LSQ 49.4% 12.8% 1.3% 0.8%
Plain + ALP LL 53.5% 17.2% 2.0% 0.8%
Fine-tuned Plain + ALP LL 72.0% 31.8% 10.0% 3.6%
50% AT LL 46.3% 25.1% 13.5% 9.4%
50% AT LL + ALP LL 45.2% 26.3% 18.7% 13.5%
100% AT LL 41.2% 25.5% 19.5% 16.3%
100% AT LL + ALP LL 37.0% 25.4% 19.6% 16.5%
Table 3: Clean and adversarial top-1 accuracy against different PGD attacks using a random target
label on Tiny ImageNet. Adversarial accuracy is evaluated against the PGD attack using  = 16 with
a different number of iterations n, step sizes i, and restarts r. The suffix LL denotes that adversarial
examples used for training were crafted with the least-likely target. CLP and LSQ models are trained
with λ = 0.25 and λ = 0.05 respectively, and augmented by N (0, 0.06) noise. All ALP models
were trained with λ = 0.5.
approach, we can reduce the adversarial accuracy for the model trained with CLP from 62.4% to
4.1%. We could not achieve a similar reduction in accuracy by using the SPSA attack with r = 1.
For the adversarially trained models, the situation is different. Even our strongest attack could not
reduce the adversarial accuracies of the models combining adversarial training with ALP below
89.9% and 85.7%. Further, the ALP model which was trained on clean samples only, achieves a
comparable adversarial accuracy of 88.9% against our strongest attack, giving an improvement of
1.7% over the models trained using adversarial training only.
2.2 Results on CIFAR-10
Results on CIFAR-10 can be found in Table 2. Again, we find that both CLP and LSQ do not give
actual robustness as the accuracy of the models trained using either CLP or LSQ can be reduced to
0.0% and 1.7%, respectively. This clearly shows that the robustness of 27.0% of the LSQ model
against the baseline PGD attack is misleading. On the other hand, we find that ALP can lead to
some robustness even against our strongest PGD attack and outperforms adversarial training by
3.4%, which is in agreement with our findings on MNIST. Note that also for CIFAR-10 we can not
achieve a similar drop in accuracy by simply using the SPSA attack.
2.3 Results on Tiny ImageNet
The results of our experiments on Tiny ImageNet are given in Table 3. Note that we use targeted
PGD attacks for crafting adversarial examples and report adversarial accuracy instead of success rate
in order to be consistent with Kannan et al. [2018]. We again find that both CLP and LSQ models
do not provide actual robustness. Next, we analyze the model provided by Kannan et al. [2018]
“Fine-tuned Plain + ALP LL (λ = 0.5)”, which was fine-tuned from a model trained on full ImageNet.
Our results show that we can reduce the adversarial accuracy from 31.8% to 3.6%. This suggests
that this model does not provide state-of-the-art robustness against white-box PGD attacks. However,
when combined with training only on targeted adversarial examples, ALP marginally improves the
adversarial accuracy over plain targeted adversarial training by 0.2% while sacrificing 4.2% of clean
accuracy. In additional experiments (Tables 4 and 5 in the Appendix) we confirm the hypothesis of
Engstrom et al. [2018] that adversarial training using an untargeted PGD attack leads to improved
adversarial accuracy. Note that Engstrom et al. [2018] can reduce the adversarial accuracy of a
pre-trained ALP model trained on full ImageNet to 0.6%. In contrast to that, we consider a different
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Figure 3: Histograms of the loss values for a single point for 10000 random restarts of the PGD attack
for CLP model trained on MNIST. We show 4 typical cases, which illustrate that there exist points
for which the loss can be successfully maximized only with a good starting point. The vertical red
line denotes the loss value of − ln(0.1), which guarantees that for this and higher values of the loss
an adversarial example can be found. More histograms can be found in Figure 8 in the Appendix.
model released by Kannan et al. [2018] that was fine-tuned on Tiny ImageNet. This explains the
difference in adversarial accuracy reported in Table 3.
3 Conclusions
We perform an empirical evaluation investigating the robustness of logit pairing methods introduced
by Kannan et al. [2018]. We find that both CLP and LSQ deteriorate the input space loss surface and
make crafting adversarial examples with gradient-based attacks difficult, without providing actual
robustness. This suggests that the current practice of evaluating against the PGD attack with default
settings can be misleading. Therefore, one should consider performing an exhaustive grid search over
the PGD attack parameters in addition to performing many random restarts of PGD, which helps
to find adversarial examples in such cases (Figures 2, 3). Finally, we show that the ALP models of
Kannan et al. [2018] do not improve drastically over adversarial training alone.
Acknowledgments. We would like to thank Michael Hedderich, Francesco Croce, and Dave
Howcroft for their helpful feedback on this paper. Furthermore, we thank the reviewers for their valu-
able comments. Marius Mosbach acknowledges partial support by the German Research Foundation
(DFG) as part of SFB 1102.
References
Anish Athalye and Nicholas Carlini. On the Robustness of the CVPR 2018 White-Box Adversarial
Example Defenses. arXiv preprint arXiv:1804.03286, 2018.
Anish Athalye and Ilya Sutskever. Synthesizing robust adversarial examples. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1707.07397, 2017.
Anish Athalye, Nicholas Carlini, and David A. Wagner. Obfuscated gradients give a false sense of
security: Circumventing defenses to adversarial examples. In Proceedings of the 35th International
Conference on Machine Learning, ICML 2018, Stockholmsmässan, Stockholm, Sweden, July 10-15,
2018, 2018.
Jacob Buckman, Aurko Roy, Colin Raffel, and Ian Goodfellow. Thermometer encoding: One hot
way to resist adversarial examples. 2018.
Nicholas Carlini and David Wagner. Towards evaluating the robustness of neural networks. In 2017
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP), pages 39–57. IEEE, 2017.
Francesco Croce, Maksym Andriushchenko, and Matthias Hein. Provable robustness of relu networks
via maximization of linear regions. arXiv preprint arXiv:1810.07481, 2018.
6
Logan Engstrom, Andrew Ilyas, and Anish Athalye. Evaluating and understanding the robustness of
adversarial logit pairing. arXiv preprint arXiv:1807.10272, 2018.
Ian J Goodfellow, Jonathon Shlens, and Christian Szegedy. Explaining and harnessing adversarial
examples. arXiv preprint arXiv:1412.6572, 2014.
Kaiming He, Xiangyu Zhang, Shaoqing Ren, and Jian Sun. Identity mappings in deep residual
networks. In Computer Vision - ECCV 2016 - 14th European Conference, Amsterdam, The
Netherlands, October 11-14, 2016, Proceedings, Part IV, pages 630–645, 2016.
Matthias Hein and Maksym Andriushchenko. Formal guarantees on the robustness of a classifier
against adversarial manipulation. In Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems, pages
2266–2276, 2017.
Christina Heinze-Deml and Nicolai Meinshausen. Conditional variance penalties and domain shift
robustness. arXiv preprint arXiv:1710.11469, 2017.
Harini Kannan, Alexey Kurakin, and Ian Goodfellow. Adversarial logit pairing. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1803.06373, 2018.
D Kingma and J Ba Adam. A method for stochastic optimization. In International Conference on
Learning Representations (ICLR), volume 5, 2015.
Aleksander Madry, Aleksandar Makelov, Ludwig Schmidt, Dimitris Tsipras, and Adrian Vladu.
Towards deep learning models resistant to adversarial attacks. arXiv preprint arXiv:1706.06083,
2017.
Nicolas Papernot, Patrick McDaniel, Ian Goodfellow, Somesh Jha, Z Berkay Celik, and Ananthram
Swami. Practical black-box attacks against machine learning. In Proceedings of the 2017 ACM on
Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pages 506–519. ACM, 2017.
Nicolas Papernot, Fartash Faghri, Nicholas Carlini, Ian Goodfellow, Reuben Feinman, Alexey Ku-
rakin, Cihang Xie, Yash Sharma, Tom Brown, Aurko Roy, Alexander Matyasko, Vahid Behzadan,
Karen Hambardzumyan, Zhishuai Zhang, Yi-Lin Juang, Zhi Li, Ryan Sheatsley, Abhibhav Garg,
Jonathan Uesato, Willi Gierke, Yinpeng Dong, David Berthelot, Paul Hendricks, Jonas Rauber,
and Rujun Long. Technical report on the cleverhans v2.1.0 adversarial examples library. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1610.00768, 2018.
Aditi Raghunathan, Jacob Steinhardt, and Percy Liang. Certified defenses against adversarial
examples. arXiv preprint arXiv:1801.09344, 2018.
Christian Szegedy, Wojciech Zaremba, Ilya Sutskever, Joan Bruna, Dumitru Erhan, Ian Goodfellow,
and Rob Fergus. Intriguing properties of neural networks. arXiv preprint arXiv:1312.6199, 2013.
Jonathan Uesato, Brendan O’Donoghue, Aaron van den Oord, and Pushmeet Kohli. Adversarial risk
and the dangers of evaluating against weak attacks. arXiv preprint arXiv:1802.05666, 2018.
Eric Wong and Zico Kolter. Provable defenses against adversarial examples via the convex outer
adversarial polytope. In International Conference on Machine Learning, pages 5283–5292, 2018.
Eric Wong, Frank Schmidt, Jan Hendrik Metzen, and J Zico Kolter. Scaling provable adversarial
defenses. arXiv preprint arXiv:1805.12514, 2018.
Kai Y Xiao, Vincent Tjeng, Nur Muhammad Shafiullah, and Aleksander Madry. Training for faster
adversarial robustness verification via inducing relu stability. arXiv preprint arXiv:1809.03008,
2018.
Zhewei Yao, Amir Gholami, Qi Lei, Kurt Keutzer, and Michael W Mahoney. Hessian-based analysis
of large batch training and robustness to adversaries. arXiv preprint arXiv:1802.08241, 2018.
Huan Zhang, Tsui-Wei Weng, Pin-Yu Chen, Cho-Jui Hsieh, and Luca Daniel. Efficient neural network
robustness certification with general activation functions. 2018.
7
Appendix A
Additional results and visualizations
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Figure 4: Input loss surfaces of CLP model on MNIST in a random subspace with  = 38.25
for the first eight test examples. The loss surface contains many local maxima and hence makes
gradient-based attacks much more difficult. This is in line with our quantitative results in Table 1,
showing that this model does not provide actual robustness and that the gradient-based PGD attack
must use many random restarts to successfully craft adversarial examples.
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Figure 5: Input loss surfaces of Plain + ALP model on MNIST in a random subspace with  = 38.25
for the first eight test examples. The loss surface has a local maximum at the input point. At the same
time, our quantitative results in Table 1 show that this model is resistant even to our strongest attack
with many random restarts of PGD attack.
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Figure 6: Input loss surfaces of LSQ model on CIFAR10 in a random subspace with  = 16.0 for the
first eight test examples. For some points, the loss surface contains local maxima and thus may pose
a problem for gradient-based attacks. This is in line with our quantitative results in Table 2, showing
that this model does not provide actual robustness, and a successful gradient-based attack must use
many random restarts of the PGD attack.
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Figure 7: Input loss surfaces of Plain + ALP model on CIFAR-10 in a random subspace with  = 16.0
for the first eight test examples. The loss surface may be suitable for gradient descent. This is in line
with our quantitative results in Table 2, showing that there is only a small benefit in using random
restarts of the PGD attack.
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Figure 8: Histograms of the loss values across 10000 random restarts of the PGD attack on CLP
model trained on MNIST for the first 16 test examples. The vertical red line denotes the loss value
of − ln(0.1), which guarantees that for this and higher values of the loss an adversarial example can
be found.
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(a) MNIST 50% AT model
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(b) MNIST clean + ALP model
Figure 9: Heatmaps of the adversarial accuracy for 50% AT and clean + ALP models trained on
MNIST for different settings of step size i and number of iterations n when running PGD with
 = 76.5.
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(a) MNIST 100% AT + ALP model
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(b) MNIST 50% AT + ALP model
Figure 10: Heatmaps of the adversarial accuracy for 100% AT + ALP and 50% AT + ALP models
trained on MNIST for different settings of step size i and number of iterations n when running PGD
with  = 76.5.
Adversarial accuracy (L∞,  = 16.0)
Model Accuracy
PGD attack, random target
i = 2.0 i = 4.0 i = 4.0
n = 10 n = 400 n = 400
r = 1 r = 1 r = 100
Plain 53.0% 3.9% 0.4% 0.4%
CLP 48.5% 12.2% 1.7% 0.7%
LSQ 49.4% 12.8% 1.3% 0.8%
Plain + ALP 53.3% 17.4% 3.1% 1.4%
Plain + ALP LL 51.5% 12.2% 0.9% 0.3%
Fine-tuned Plain + ALP LL 72.0% 31.8% 10.0% 3.6%
50% AT 54.7% 23.1% 21.5% 17.9%
50% AT + ALP 37.4% 26.1% 23.2% 20.1%
50% AT LL 46.3% 25.1% 13.5% 9.4%
50% AT LL + ALP LL 45.2% 26.3% 18.7% 13.5%
100% AT 19.6% 15.4% 15.0% 12.5%
100% AT LL 41.2% 25.5% 19.5% 16.3%
100% AT LL + ALP LL 37.0% 25.4% 19.6% 16.5%
Table 4: Clean and adversarial top-1 accuracy against different PGD attacks using a random target
label on Tiny ImageNet. The suffix LL denotes that adversarial examples used for training were
crafted with the least-likely target. If omitted, adversarial examples were crafted using an untargeted
attack. CLP and LSQ models are trained with λ = 0.25 and λ = 0.05 respectively, and augmented
by N (0, 0.06) noise. All ALP models were trained with λ = 0.5.
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Adversarial accuracy (L∞,  = 16.0)
Model Accuracy
PGD attack, least-likely target
i = 2.0 i = 4.0 i = 4.0
n = 10 n = 400 n = 400
r = 1 r = 1 r = 100
Plain 53.0% 5.6% 0.1% 0.0%
CLP 48.5% 11.6% 0.9% 0.0%
LSQ 49.4% 11.5% 0.3% 0.0%
Plain + ALP 53.3% 23.7% 6.2% 1.3%
Plain + ALP LL 51.5% 17.0% 1.9% 0.0%
Fine-tuned Plain + ALP LL 72.0% 38.3% 14.8% 4.2%
50% AT 54.7% 19.6% 19.2% 15.5%
50% AT + ALP 37.4% 29.4% 27.1% 22.2%
50% AT LL 46.3% 29.8% 22.6% 13.3%
50% AT LL + ALP LL 45.2% 28.7% 25.6% 17.4%
100% AT 19.6% 16.0% 15.2% 13.2%
100% AT LL 41.2% 28.9% 27.8% 21.8%
100% AT LL + ALP LL 37.0% 27.6% 25.7% 19.7%
Table 5: Clean and adversarial top-1 accuracy against different PGD attacks using the least-likely
target label on Tiny ImageNet. The suffix LL denotes that adversarial examples used for training
were crafted with the least-likely target. If omitted, adversarial examples were crafted using an
untargeted attack. CLP and LSQ models are trained with λ = 0.25 and λ = 0.05 respectively, and
augmented by N (0, 0.06) noise. All ALP models were trained with λ = 0.5.
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